jild-i 1. Az ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd Kātib (59 Sh.) tā Abū al-Ḥasan Masʻūdī (336 Sh.) -- jild-i 2. Az Abū al-Ḥasan ʻĀmirī (291 Sh.) tā Abū al-Faz̤l Bayhaqī (465 Sh.) -- jild-i 3. Az Nāṣir Khusraw (383 Sh.) tā Sadīd al-Dīn ʻAwfī (616 Sh.) -- jild-i 4. Az Najm al-Dīn Rāzī (553 Sh.) tā Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (748 Sh.) -- jild-i 5. Az ʻUbayd Zākānī (670 Sh.) tā Jalāl al-Dīn Sayūṭī (884 Sh.) -- jild-i 6. Az Rūzbihān Khunjī (825 Sh.) tā Shaykh (...) Ḥurr ʻĀmilī (1071 Sh.) -- jild-i 7. Az ʻAlāmah Majlisī (1006 Sh.) tā Muḥammad Bāqir Shafaq (1223 Sh.) -- jild-i 8. Az Muḥammad Ṣādiq Marvazī (1147 Sh.) tā Mīrzā Fatḥʻalī Ākhūndzādah (1289 Sh.) -- jild-i 9. Az Mīrzā-yi Shīrāzī Avval (1194 Sh.) tā Ākhūnd Khurāsānī (1290 Sh.) -- jild-i 10. Az ʻAbd Allāh Māzandarānī (1219 Sh.) tā Saʻd Zaghlūl (1306 Sh.) -- jild-i 11. Az ʻImād al-ʻUlamāʼ Khalkhālī (1237 Sh.) tā ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz S̲aʻālibī (1323 Sh.) -- jild-i 12. Az Āyat Allāh Burūjirdī (1254 Sh.) tā Muḥammad Amīn Rasūlʹzādah (1333 Sh.) -- jild-i 13. Az ʻAbd al-Karīm Zanjānī (1263 Sh.) tā Amīn al-Ḥusaynī (1353 Sh.) -- jild-i 14. Az Jamālzādah (1274 Sh.) tā Mahdī Bāzargān (1373) -- jild-i 15. Az Muḥammad Ḥamīd Allāh (1286 Sh.) tā Muṭahharī (1358 Sh.) -- jild-i 16. Az Farīdūn Ādamīyat (1299 Sh.) tā Muṣṭafá Khumaynī (1356 Sh.) -- jild-i 17. Az Samīr Amīn (1310 Sh.) tā Ḥasan Ḥanafī -- jild-i 18. Az Sayyid Muḥammad Bāqir Ṣadr (1314 Sh.) tā Rāshid al-Ghanūshī -- jild-i 19. Az ʻAlī Awmlīl (1321 Sh.) tā Ṭāriq Ramaz̤ān. (shrink)

On rationality, reason and criticism -- Arabs. ; Islamic philosophy of Muḥammad ʻĀbid Jābirī and Mohammed Arkoun.

Explanation of the philosophical position (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Ce volume recueille des elements propres a eclairer l'oeuvre de Duns Scot et entend montrer que sa lecture n'est pas pas inutile pour comprendre Thomas d'Aquin. Gilson rappelle que le sens des principes dont use l'auteur ne se comprend bien que par l'usage qu'il en fait. Car le Docteur Subtil ne nous a pas laisse un systeme: la parole de Dieu, dont il cherche l'intellection, n'est pas un donne a reconstruire par mode de deduction. La philosophie, la sienne en propre, (...) doit etre traversee de themes fondamentaux ausquels il revient sans cesse pour eclairer les profondeirs de la foi. On trouvera dans cet ouvrage magistral des analyses fondees sur les Commentaires de Pierre Lombard par Duns Scot, ainsi que des etudes sur l'objet de la metaphysique, l'existence de l'etre infini, la nature divine, l'origine du contringent, la connaissance intellectuelle et la volonte. (shrink)

L'importance de Duns Scot (1265?-1308) pour l'histoire de la métaphysique et de l'éthique n'est plus à démontrer. En demandant à Olivier Boulnois de recueillir ces études, Philosophie tente de se faire l'écho de la floraison récente de travaux consacrés à cet auteur, aussi bien à l'étranger qu'en France. L'article de Stephen Dumont souligne la place fondamentale de Scot dans l'histoire de la métaphysique. Mais au lieu de se centrer sur la tradition moderne de la métaphysique transcendantale (de Suarez à Kant), (...) il insiste sur le fait que Scot résout l'énigme de la Métaphysique d'Aristote en réduisant sa dimension théologique de celle-ci à sa dimension ontologique. La philosophie scotiste apparaît ainsi comme l'aboutissement d'une exploration systématique des possibilités d'interprétation ouvertes par le texte aristotélicien. L'étude d'Olivier Boulnois fait la transition entre la métaphysique et l'éthique. Elle s'interroge sur le fondement métaphysique de l'éthique scotiste et montre comment le primat d'une volonté libre, et, dans le monde fini, la contingence de la loi morale, s'accompagnent d'une objectivité du bien. La rigueur de la liberté n'est précisément pas l'arbitraire. Gérard Sondag, quant à lui, pose, à partir d'un point très précis d'exégèse aristotélicienne - pour quelle raison le citoyen courageux expose-t-il sa vie quand la Cité est en danger? - la question du fondement éthique du sacrifice de soi. En rejetant, dans sa réponse, toute éthique de l'intérêt personnel, et en posant une objectivité de la norme éthique indépendante de notre propre avantage, Scot ouvre une voie qui conduit à la morale normative de Kant. Duns Scot apparaît ainsi à la fois comme le refondateur de la métaphysique comme discipline transcendantale et comme un penseur original de l'éthique. Unissant ces deux dimensions, il est l'auteur d'une véritable métaphysique de l'éthique. (shrink)

A quelle certitude puis-je pretendre dans la connaissance des phenomenes naturels? De quelle nature sont les premiers principes de la connaissance, et comment les connait-on? Comment une proposition scientifique, en se rapportant a un objet de connaissance, atteste-t-elle ainsi de sa verite objective? Qu'est-ce qui fait l'unite d'une science en general, au-dela de la multiplicite des connaissances qui la constituent? Sur quel fondement se definissent et se separent les sciences speculatives reelles (metaphysique, physique, mathematique)? En vertu de quelle structure la (...) logique et la metaphysique sont-elles articulees? Telles sont quelques unes des questions fondamentales qui innervent la theorie du savoir de Jean Duns Scot et manifestent l'importance et l'acuite de sa speculation epistemologique. A ne pas se focaliser sur la seule dimension metaphysique de la pensee du Docteur Subtil, et a la reinscrire bien plutot a l'interieur de sa theorie de la connaissance, de ses concepts et de ses problemes, on pourra s'apercevoir alors qu'au-dela de la refondation de la metaphysique par l'univocite de l'etant, un geste plus important encore s'est produit chez Duns Scot: une autonomisation des principes de la connaissance objective sur la metaphysique, autonomisation qui ouvre un espace metaphysiquement neutre: celui de la pure possibilite objective en general. (shrink)

이 논문의 목적은 둔스 스코투스의 직관적 인식 개념의 역사적 의미를 설명하는 것이다. 스코투스에 따르면 직관적 인식은 다음의 두 조건이 충족될 때 성립한다. 즉 대상이 실존하며, 대상이 인과적 대리물을 통하지 않고 직접적으로 제시되어야 한다는 것이다. 그리고 추상적 인식이란 두 가지 조건 중 어느 하나를 충족시키지 못하는 인식이다. 스코투스 시대까지 일반적인 관점은, 적어도 현세적 삶에서 추상은 지성의 주요할 뿐 아니라 유일한 작용방식이라는 것이었다. 그러나 스코투스는 추상과 직관의 구별을 감각뿐 아니라 지성적 인식에도 적용되는 구별로 본다. 지성적 직관에 대한 스코투스의 통찰은 중세 개별자 인식의 (...) 문제에 새로운 빛을 던져준다. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie zasadniczych różnic między rozumieniem pojęć kontyngencji, wolności, indywidualności w filozofii Szkota w odniesieniu do tradycji arystotelesowskiej. Podkreślam, że istotnymi elementami koncepcji Szkota, będącymi wyraźnym odejściem od klasycznego arystotelizmu, są: (1) odrzucenie zasady pełności, (2) interpretacja teraźniejszości jako niekoniecznej, (3) rozwinięcie pojęcia synchronicznej kontyngencji, (4) zerwanie związku między niezmiennością i koniecznością. W swej antropologii Szkot kładzie nacisk na (1) pojęcie wolnej wolijako władzy autonomicznej i zdolnej do samodeterminacji, (2) przypisuje woli racjonalność, która nie polega na zależności woli (...) od intelektu czy wiedzy, (3) odchodzi od arystotelesowskiego eudajmonizmu. Boga traktuje jako zdolnego do poznania i miłowania jednostkowych, kontyn- gentnych bytów. W swej aksjologii podkreśla pozytywny wymiar indywidualności, wielości i nie- powtarzalnościjednostek. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie zasadniczych różnic między rozumieniem pojęć kontyngencji, wolności, indywidualności w filozofii Szkota w odniesieniu do tradycji arystotelesowskiej. Podkreślam, że istotnymi elementami koncepcji Szkota, będącymi wyraźnym odejściem od klasycznego arystotelizmu, są: (1) odrzucenie zasady pełności, (2) interpretacja teraźniejszości jako niekoniecznej, (3) rozwinięcie pojęcia synchronicznej kontyngencji, (4) zerwanie związku między niezmiennością i koniecznością. W swej antropologii Szkot kładzie nacisk na (1) pojęcie wolnej wolijako władzy autonomicznej i zdolnej do samodeterminacji, (2) przypisuje woli racjonalność, która nie polega na zależności woli (...) od intelektu czy wiedzy, (3) odchodzi od arystotelesowskiego eudajmonizmu. Boga traktuje jako zdolnego do poznania i miłowania jednostkowych, kontyn- gentnych bytów. W swej aksjologii podkreśla pozytywny wymiar indywidualności, wielości i nie- powtarzalnościjednostek. (shrink)

"L'intérêt de cet ouvrage qui a précédé immédiatement la méditation de Sein und Zeit est aujourd'hui, de l'avis même de son auteur, d'illustrer la constance dans son oeuvre d'une double préoccupation : le problème de la langue et le problème de l'être. Jeune philosophe, il a déjà publié une thèse de doctorat concernant la logique. Mais sa thèse d'habilitation, que voici, le montre aux prises avec le projet d'une instauration radicale de la philosophie". Bulletin Gallimard n°239, hiver 1970.

Si la volonté n’est pas la raison, mais que l’une et l’autre concourent au libre arbitre, peut-on dépasser cette dualité? À la suite de Grosseteste, le concept de racine a un temps pu être mobilisé pour penser l’identité de l’âme à elle-même, en dépit de la variété, et distinction, de ses puissances. Mais le modèle de la racine, qui suggère des puissances qui proviennent de l’âme, pour s’en séparer, convient-il pour rendre compte de cette identité dans la différence? Nous examinons (...) le recours à ce modèle chez trois auteurs oxoniens du milieu du xiii e siècle, puis sa reprise chez Thomas d’Aquin, avant de considérer le choix fait par Duns Scot de l’idée d’une contenance unitive. (shrink)

Dans cette question sur le livre II des Sentences, Guiral Ot demande si la créature, avant sa création, a un être propre, distinct de celui du Créateur : d’une part, Dieu crée ex nihilo ; avant la création, il n’y a donc rien, hormis Dieu ; d’autre part, Dieu connaît et veut de toute éternité ce qu’il produira avant de le produire ; les créatures ont bien un être-connu et un être-voulu en Dieu. Pour répondre à cette difficulté, Duns Scot (...) avait admis un être possible et un être relatif des créatures dans la pensée divine. Mais, avec plus de subtilité encore, Guiral Ot aperçoit neuf manières pour les choses d’être dans la pensée divine avant d’être créées. C’est le déploiement de ces modes d’être ainsi que leur articulation que nous révèle l’édition de cette question. (shrink)

Māturīdism is an Ottoman identity and this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire. It maintained its formal existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly (...) in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. The new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. However, even in this period, Māturīdism was remarkably reflected in the muqaddimāt-i arba‘a literature which was directly sponsored by Meḥmed II. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. Shiism and its all other variants were bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. Unfortunately such a refutational approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in the refutation texts against Ṣafawids. This brought to the fore at first the Ḥanafite and then the Māturīdite identity. This paper attempts to analyze this changing emphasis on Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the political and intellectual factors that supported and nourished it. -/- SUMMARY It can be argued that the debates around Ash‘arism and Māturīdism in the Ottoman period and the resulting meant more than attempts of the members of the two sides to understand each other and that Māturīdism, particularly from the 16th century onwards, was gradually brought fore as the identity of Ottomans. In fact, this identity was not limited, as is commonly believed, to the last period of the Empire; it maintained, in form, its existence throughout the Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the context in which the Māturīdism was located or with which it was associated changed in the course of time. In the early period when the eclectic way of thinking was dominant, Māturīdism as a creed was apparent mainly in the jurists whose ascetic identity was prominent and partly in the mystical currents that were essentially continuations of Yasawiyya. At this point, the Bukhara-centered Ḥanafī legal literature played a distinctive role. At the time of Meḥmed II and in the following period during which the philosophical kalām dominated the scene, the Māturīdism was relatively passive and was in search of a position against the Ash‘arism. In this period, Ottoman scholars still embraced the Māturīdī-Ḥanafī line in their theological views. Ḫiḍir Beg’s al-Qaṣīda al-Nūniyya, and al-Khayālī’s commentary upon it, and the commentary written by Aḥmad b. Oġuz Dānishmand al-Aḳshahrī on al-I‘timād of Abū al-Barakāt al-Nasafī were the most noticeable Māturīdite texts from that time. Besides, al-Khayālī’s supercommentary (ḥāshiya) upon the commentary of al-Taftāzānī written on al-‘Aqā’id of Najm al-Dīn ‘Umar al-Nasafī was also of central importance. However, the new Rāzian paradigm of thought that began to be felt strongly in the Ottoman lands with Meḥmed II as an attempt of integration into the global circulation of knowledge prevented to a certain extent the visibility of Māturīdism. But, this should not be taken to mean that Māturīdism lost its ground of existence. That the Ash‘arite works produced in this new paradigm were transferred to and fully integrated in the madrasa curriculum was not because they were Ash‘arite texts but because they were the most original and highest achievements of the philosophical theology. These texts that aimed at combining all fields of knowledge on a single platform, despite the Ash‘arism they included, constituted the peak of the Islamic thought of the time. In the preference of these texts, the fact that the Māturīdī tradition generally stood, in course of time, distant to the philosophy and chose to continue the kalām in the classical line also played a role. Māturīdī theologians Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Samarqandī, partly, but Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a al-Maḥbūbī, to a greater extent, were notable exceptions to this general Māturīdī tendency. These figures were theologically Māturīdite, but their framework of producing discourse was the combination of philosophy and kalām as with their Ash‘arī counterparts. Therefore, Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s criticism of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and through him, of against the Ash‘arism in the context of muqaddimāt arba‘a was wholeheartedly supported by the Ottoman ulama. Even it was Meḥmed II who sponsored the debates regarding muqaddimāt arba‘a. The works written by such scholars as Muṣliḥ al-Dīn al-Kastallī, al-Ṣamṣūnī, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-‘Arabī, Mollā ‘Arab al-Anṭākī, Khaṭībzāde, Sa‘dī Chalabī during his and his son Bāyazid II’s reigns were the supercommentaries written upon the related chapter of al-Talwīḥ, al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a’s al-Tawḍīḥ where the former responded to the criticism of the latter from an Ash‘arī point of view. The Ottoman ulama, in their workswere forced to choose between the two scholars and they mostly supported Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a and Māturīdism. The tradition of philosophical kalām in the Ottoman scholarship, just when it was about to yield significant results, was interrupted due to the struggle against the Ṣafawids. Transformation of this political tension, at the same time, into a fight against Shiism also brought about a constriction in the religious thought of the Ottomans. The reflex of of identifying oneself through ‘the other’ made, to a certain extent, the theological and philosophical debates regarding faith meaningless, and gradually gave the Ottoman Sunnism a doctrinal and political tone. In such a context, the Ottomans’ paradigm of producing thought in line with the philosophical kalām began to lose its function, and, the focus of scholarhsip shifted; Shiism with its all variants were began to be bitterly attacked under the main heading of Rāfiḍa. When the refutation texts composed from the reign of Bāyazid II onward to criticize the Ṣafawids are chronologically analyzed, it is seen that the contents of the texts evolved from criticism of Rāfiḍa to criticism of Sūfism. Ḥanafī fatwā literature was used extensively in these refutations. So the fatwās issued against Rāfiḍa and Ṣūfīs in malāmatī line in earlier centuries in different contexts for different reasons were employed to criticize the new opponents. This caused two important results: First, such an approach proved a boomerang and returned in time striking the Ottoman Ṣūfīs who stood near the line of the Ardabil Shrine before its Shiitization. Ḫalwatīs, Bayrāmīs, Gulshanīs, Baktāshīs and Mawlawīs were the sufi groups influenced by this situation in varying degrees. Second, Sunnism was exposed to the narrowization and centered around the fiqh, particularly Ḥanafī fiqh, in the context of Ḳāḍīzādelīs who were the main adversaries of above mentioned groups. The culture of catechism (‘ilm-i ḥāl) that came to the fore through the efforts of Ḳāḍīzādelīs was a crystallization and was mainly fuelled from this tension. Such a crystallization led the Ṣūfīs, the opponents of Ḳāḍīzādelīs, to a higher level of discourse deemphasizing the Ḥanafī aspect: They underscored the discourse of Ahl al-Sunna and four madhhabs, and mostly turned towards the Shāfiʿī and Ash‘arī traditions to look for support fortheir views. This process during which the emphasis of sharī‘a and tradition began to come to the fore once again paved the way for the zuhd and fiqh-centered religious thought that was maintained from the time of the Seljukids in Anatolia and was influential until Meḥmed II’ reign. Therefore in the Ottomans, particularly starting with the reign of Suleymān I, an intensive emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa was witnessed. Abū Ḥanīfa was at the very center of the debates revolving around zuhd and fiqh which came about in the same period and in which the sharī‘a sensitivity was a determining factor. Al-Māturīdī, whose name was overshadowed for a long time by the name of Abū Ḥanīfa, but who became prominent in the tradition with Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, had to transfer his gains for a period of time to Abū Ḥanīfa. Emphasis on Abū Ḥanīfa looks like a rope that when pulled, all the tradition comes with it. When the topics began to be discussed in a manner that would also include the theological context, the contribution of the works ascribed to Abū Ḥanīfa, namely al-Fiqh al-Akbar, al-Waṣiyya and al-‘Ālim wa al-Muta‘allim to the discussions would be limited. For this reason, the need to refer to al-Māturīdī or to the theological formation bearing his name was inevitable. So, the literature on the points of disagreements between the Ash‘arism and the Māturīdism developed both vertically and horizontally in the 18th century and, corollary to that, the debates of free will as a corolloary to that, once again brought Māturīdism to the fore. (shrink)

Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v tomto (...) etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v „denaturalizácii“ morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Quelle place l'infinité divine occupe-t-elle dans la philosophie cartésienne? Peut-elle éclairer la situation de Descartes dans le temps long de l'histoire de la métaphysique ou révéler une béance toujours sise au coeur de son concept? Loin d'être une innovation cartésienne, l'infinité de Dieu constitue une conquête de l'histoire de la métaphysique, qui, en prenant pour objet le concept d'ens, s'est approprié Dieu sous la figure de l'ens infinitum. Et parce que la philosophia prima des Meditationes a pour premier principe le (...) cogito, l'idea infiniti ne peut que s'ordonner à l'univocité de la cogitatio et se soumettre au régime métaphysique de la représentation, qu'elle prolonge et accomplit. Mais Descartes confère à l'infini une autre détermination, qui contredit sa portée métaphysique : car, en toute rigueur, l'infini ne se donne pas tant en une représentation, qu'il n'excède toute représentation pour la conditionner. Ainsi Descartes démontre-t-il l'existence de Dieu au moyen du nom qui énonce d'abord sa transcendance à toute démonstration ; ainsi l'idée d'infini est-elle plus "lourde" que l'ego qui la porte et qu'elle creuse d'une antériorité à jamais irrécupérable. Descartes a donc associé en un même nom - l'infini - une détermination métaphysique et une détermination non métaphysique de Dieu. Mais cette double détermination traduit l'ambiguïté même de l'infini dans l'histoire de la métaphysique, s'il est vrai que c'est aussi bien comme infini que Dieu y est entré (Duns Scot) et qu'il en est sorti (Levinas). L'infinité divine peut dès lors accomplir chez Descartes la sortie de la métaphysique depuis la métaphysique elle-même, puisqu'elle nomme l'au-delà de la représentation apparu depuis la représentation : la métaphysique se trouverait alors contemporaine de sa fin, qui toujours en sourdine la double et la défait. En la déployant sans nuances, Descartes fait accéder à sa visibilité la plus haute l'ambiguïté de l'infini : sa métaphysique en acquiert une ambivalence à laquelle nous n'avons pas voulu demeurer aveugle. D. A. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui explique l'unité d'une substance leibnizienne, au-dessus des attributs compris dans sa notion individuelle complète? C'est une question commune dans la littérature sur la notion de la substance chez Leibniz. Cet article soutient qu'elle n'admette pas de réponse consistante dans le système leibnizien. Premièrement, je discute la manière dans laquelle Leibniz a essayé de répondre à la question en „rehabillitant" a les formes substantielles des scholastiques. Puis je cherche à montrer que ça lui a ammené à une conception composée (...) de la nature de la substance, une position similaire de quelques façons à celle de Duns Scotus. Cette conception composée, cependant, n'est pas soutenable étant donné que Leibniz a rejeté la „distinction formelle" de Scotus. (shrink)

Résumé L’usage par Nicolas de Cues du thème de l’infini pour caractériser la divinité et la place éminente des mathématiques dans sa doctrine semblent autoriser un rapprochement avec Duns Scot. Dans cette contribution on tente de montrer les profondes différences entre les deux entreprises et plus généralement l’originalité du Cusain par rapport à la scolastique du xiv e siècle. En revanche sa postérité leibnizienne est peu contestable.

Hlavným cieľom práce je identifikovať antinaturalistické črty etiky Dunsa Scota. Predpokladom je objasnenie pojmu naturalizmu. V teoretickej filozofii je možné rozlíšiť metafyzický, vedecko-metodologický a sémanticko-analytický naturalizmus. V praktickej filozofii je naturalizmus prítomný v etike cnosti, v ktorej sa pri dosahovaní dobrého života pracuje s pojmom ľudskej prirodzenosti a emočno-afektívna stránka človeka je relevantným prvkom etického uvažovania. Voči nej stojí etika pravidiel, podľa ktorej je zdrojom morálne dobrého ľudská racionalita, prax má byť formovaná podľa poznania rozumu a emocionalita je v tomto (...) etickom uvažovaní irelevantná. Na základe rozboru niektorých diel Dunsa Scota je jeho etika antinaturalistická v týchto bodoch: vôľa ako protiklad prirodzenosti; oddelenie morálky a blaženosti; sekundárny význam emócií v etickom uvažovaní; univerzálne záväzný imperatív lásky k Bohu; vôľa ako sídlo morálnych cností. Spojenie blaženosti, cnosti a prirodzenosti u Scota stráca vnútornú súdržnosť, prirodzené a morálne dobro nekonvergujú, čo sa odráža v „denaturalizácii“ morálky. Na základe identifikácie antinaturalistických čŕt Scotovej etiky prichádzame k záveru, že jeho etika má bližšie k etike pravidiel. (shrink)

Artykuł stanowi próbę zarysowania kilku istotnych wątków dwóch istotnych średniowiecznych koncepcji celowości. Twórcami owych koncepcji są Jan Duns Szkot i Walter Chatton. Autor skupia się na trzech zagadnieniach: (1) argumentach na rzecz przyjęcia teleologii naturalnej, (2) statusie ontologicznym celu, (3) statusie Boga jako przyczyny celowej. Dokonywane analizy mają pokazać, iż wiele poglądów wygłaszanych przez Dunsa Szkota i Chattona stanowiło podważenie wcześniejszej scholastycznej wizji całościowej teleologii, która swą najbardziej dojrzała postać otrzymała w myśli Tomasza z Akwinu, przygotowując nadejście nowożytnej krytyki celowości.

Cet article est destiné à montrer qu’antérieurement au développement par Ockham d’une doctrine de l’intuition du non-existant, deux théologiens parisiens avaient déjà construit, chacun à sa manière, une théorie de la connaissance intuitive qui établissait, contre Duns Scot, la possibilité de l’intuition d’une chose non-existante ou absente : Gérard de Bologne et Hervé de Nédellec. L’étude philosophique de ce thème chez ces deux penseurs s’appuie sur l’édition critique de leurs Quodlibeta qu’a réalisée l’auteur de l’article.

BackgroundThe prognosis of hypertensive intracerebral hemorrhage is poor at high altitudes. The objective of this study was to explore whether hyperbaric oxygen can improve the results of computed tomography perfusion imaging and the neurological function of patients with HICH, and influence the hemoglobin concentration.MethodThe patients with HICH were treated with puncture and drainage. Twenty-one patients were treated with HBO after the operation, and the other patients received conventional treatment. CTP was performed twice, and all indices were measured. Scatter plots were (...) used to determine the effect of hemoglobin concentration on CTP imaging. Receiver operating characteristic curves were plotted to analyze the effects of hemoglobin concentration and hematoma volume on recovery results. The patients were followed up for 6 months.ResultsForty-one patients with HICH were treated with puncture and drainage. In total, 21 were treated with HBO after the operation, and 20 received conventional treatment as the control group. No significant differences in the CBV and CBF values of the two groups were noted before treatment. After 10 days, the values of CBV and CBF in the HBO group were significantly higher than those in the control group. A scatter diagram showed there was no significant in the HBO group, but significant correlation for the CBV and CBF values in the control group’s hematoma center and margin. The ROC curves showed that hematoma volume had an influence on prognosis of the control group. The Glasgow Coma Scale scores of the HBO group were significantly higher than those of the control group.ConclusionsHBO therapy can improve the postoperative CBV and CBF values of patients with HICH and ameliorate their prognoses. There was no significant correlation between HBO group and hemoglobin concentration on admission. (shrink)

Abstract:Pedro Erber and Facundo Vega speak with Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback about Heidegger's influence on philosophy in Brazil and beyond.

An increasing number of studies demonstrated the involvement of the cerebellum in sequence processing. The current preliminary study is the first to investigate the causal involvement of the cerebellum in sequence generation, using low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. By targeting the posterior cerebellum, we hypothesized that the induced neuro-excitability modulation would lead to altered performance on a Picture and Story sequencing task, which involve the generation of the correct chronological order of various social and non-social stories depicted in cartoons or (...) sentences. Our results indicate that participants receiving LF-rTMS over the cerebellum, as compared to sham participants, showed a stronger learning effect from pre to post stimulation for both tasks and for all types of sequences. No differences between sequence types were observed. Our results suggest a positive effect of LF-rTMS on sequence generation. We conclude that the cerebellum is causally involved in the generation of sequences of social and nonsocial events. Our discussion focuses on recommendations for future studies. (shrink)

L’article s’emploie à comparer la doctrine de l’Incarnation dans les trois grandes œuvres spéculatives de saint Thomas : Scriptum super Sententiis, Summa contra Gentiles, Summa theologiae. Il examine d’abord le plan suivi dans les trois ouvrages pour traiter ce thème ; puis la façon dont saint Thomas remédie à deux lacunes de la christologie du Lombard (convenances de l’Incarnation, mystères de la vie du Christ) ; ensuite, les deux opinions christologiques du Lombard rejetées par les docteurs parisiens et concernant, l’une, (...) l’âme séparée du corps et, l’autre, la question de savoir si, durant le triduum mortis, le Christ était un homme ; enfin, dix-sept des articuli in quibus. Malgré son caractère pointilliste, cette recherche permet d’explorer les aspects essentiels de la christologie de saint Thomas, de souligner les progrès de sa pensée et aussi de relever quelques positions problématiques de son enseignement. (shrink)

Wczesny Descartes dokonuje radykalnego usunięcia z rozważań filozoficznych problemu poznania boskiego. Rekonstrukcja wielowiekowej tradycji średniowiecznej ukazała, że daleko idąca racjonalizacja opisu boskiego poznania prowadzi nieuchronnie do groźnej aporii dotyczącej statusu idei-przedmiotu w boskim intelekcie. Zwolennikiem uproszczenia na gruncie metafizyki był Duns Szkot, który dość zdecydowanie porzucił dziedziczony od Platona problem wzorów idei na rzecz wolnego, absolutnego i rozumnego przyczynowania o dominującym charakterze sprawczym. Zgodnie z dystynkcją wprowadzoną przez św. Tomasza, oprócz zagadnienia samych wzorów-rzeczy pojawia się oddzielny problem statusu ogólnych praw (...) rozumnego stwarzania. W obliczu niejasności otwierających możliwość poddania Boga takim prawom, Descartes jako pierwszy umieszcza tzw. prawdy wieczne w dystansie przyczynowym uznając później za „wrodzone” wyposażenie ego. W ten sposób uzyskujemy jasność co do ewentualnej skończoności lub nieskończoności nowego podmiotu. Jak pokazał Kartezjusz w Regułach, samo konstytuowanie przedmiotów Mathesis ma zasięg nieograniczony, choć sprawująca je władza podmiotowa doświadcza swej skończoności dwojako: po pierwsze, w ograniczeniu trwania oczywistości uporządkowanego szeregu ; po drugie, we wtórności względem prawd wiecznych, które choć wytwarzane przez mens, są jednocześnie uprzednio ustanowione. Poszukiwane przez nas związki pomiędzy średniowiecznymi teoriami poznania boskiego a nową teorią przedmiotowości potwierdziły złożoność badanego przełomu myślowego. Choć można mówić o podobieństwach zarówno opisywanych struktur poznawania, jak też używanych pojęć, teoria Descartes’a jest do nich niesprowadzalna. Choć w swej konstrukcji przedmiotu Mathesis, podmiot stycznie zdaje się imitować boskie intellectio, to jednak natychmiast uświadamia on sobie i opisuje własne ograniczenia. Pamiętać należy, że nie jest to ostatnie słowo Descartes’a, który kwestie z pogranicza epistemologii i teologii podejmie z nowymi siłami począwszy od Medytacji o pierwszej filozofii, centralnym zagadnieniem stanie się jednak nie tyle autonomiczny podmiot, co raczej idea nieskończoności. (shrink)

Ibn Wasil (d. 1298), perhaps better known today as a historian and an emissary to the court of King Manfred in southern Italy, was also an eminent logician. The present work is a critical edition of his main work in the field, a commentary on his teacher Khunaji's (d. 1248) handbook al-Jumal. The work helped consolidate the logic of the "later scholars" (such as Khunaji). It also shows that commentators did much more than merely explain the original work and instead (...) regularly discussed and assessed received views. Ibn Wasil's work was an influential contribution to a particularly dynamic chapter in the history of Arabic logic. (shrink)

Ibn Wasil (d. 1298), perhaps better known today as a historian and an emissary to the court of King Manfred in southern Italy, was also an eminent logician. The present work is a critical edition of his main work in the field, a commentary on his teacher Khunaji's (d. 1248) handbook al-Jumal. The work helped consolidate the logic of the "later scholars" (such as Khunaji). It also shows that commentators did much more than merely explain the original work and instead (...) regularly discussed and assessed received views. Ibn Wasil's work was an influential contribution to a particularly dynamic chapter in the history of Arabic logic. (shrink)

Depuis maintenant plusieurs années, le lecteur francophone encourt une dette de gratitude envers Gérard Sondag pour des traductions et des présentations originales de textes de Duns Scot. Le présent ouvrage nous fournit une introduction précieuse à la nature de la théologie selon Scot. Le texte traduit est le Prologue de la Lectura en quatre questions qui traitent de la nécessité pour l’homme d’une doctrine révélée sur Dieu, du sujet de la théologie, du statut scientifique de la théologie, et du caractère (...) «pratique» de la théologie. La traduction est accompagnée d’une quantité généreuse de notes et elle est précédée d’un «Commentaire continu» par Gérard Sondag où transparaît un contrôle impressionnant de toute l’œuvre du Subtil. Une note d’édition introduit le lecteur dans les problèmes de traduction que rencontre le vulgarisateur de Scot aujourd’hui et qui sont dus au caractère hyperformel de sa pensée. On peut signaler la note éclairante sur la polysémie du mot necessarium chez Scot. (shrink)

This book argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. The central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through. To develop and defend this central claim, the first step is to show that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social (...) ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. The second step is to show that, when taken together, objections to the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology) imply that this model needs to be given up in favor of nonideal social ontology. In other words, we should look to nonideal rather than ideal social ontology for core concepts. The third step is to offer a positive account, called the power view, of nonideal social ontology. This account places the concept of social power at the core of a general theory of the social world and replaces the flat and narrow conception of power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably and oddly overlooked in the literature. (shrink)

Justice Across Ages offers an attractive account of justice between the young and the old that brings together three notable principles of age-group justice: complete-lives equality, relational equality, and prudence. Yet, the book says little about the fact that many of us live longer than others, and the little it does say casts doubt on whether lifespan inequality threatens justice as construed by the three principles. This essay argues, instead, that theories of justice between the young and the old should (...) not dispense with a conception of justice between different longevity groups. It concludes that we must be sensitive to lifespan variations when designing policies to promote justice across age groups. (shrink)

An English translation of John Duns Scotus's The Questions on Aristotle's "De Interpretatione" including an extensive commentary on some of Scotus's more difficult ideas.